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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
CLAIMS. The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan provided for
payment over the life of the plan of a claim secured by a
tractor-trailer used in the debtor’s truck hauling business.
The issue involved was the value of the truck for purposes
of the claim and plan payments. The debtor argued that the
truck was to be valued according to the amount of
proceeds resulting from a foreclosure sale, less the costs of
the sale. The creditor sought a fair market value of the
truck for replacement purposes. The court held that,
because the truck remained in the possession of the debtor
for the production of income, the truck was to be valued as
an operating business asset, using the replacement value.
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879
(1997), rev’g, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’g en
banc, 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 1994), rev’g unrep. D. Ct.
dec. aff’g, 149 B.R. 430 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS. The debtor had
made several payments of employment taxes to the IRS
within 90 days before filing the Chapter 11 petition. The
payments were not designated by the debtor and the IRS
applied the payments to non-trust fund taxes owed by the
debtor. The debtor sought to avoid and recover the
payments as preferential under Section 547(b). The court
found that the debtor was insolvent during the 90 day pre-
petition period, the payments were made for the benefit of
the IRS, and the IRS received more than it would have if
the debtor filed for Chapter 7 before the payments were
made. The court held, however, that the debtor had a
beneficial interest in the payments only to the extent the
payment represented the debtor's share of the social
security tax on the wages paid. In addition, the court held
that the payments were not made for an antecedent debt
but were made for taxes due after the payments were made
(an employer's social security taxes are due at the end of
the employment quarter); therefore, the payments were not
preferential under Section 547(b). After reconsideration,
the Bankruptcy Court held that the payments made after
the date for which penalties would be assessed were
payments made for an antecedent debt and were
recoverable as preferential transfers. The IRS also argued
that the late payments were excepted from the preferential
transfer rules in that the payments were made in the
ordinary course of business. The court held that the debtor
had a history of making timely payments; therefore, the
late payments were not made in the ordinary course of
business. In re Pullman Const. Industries, Inc., 210
B.R. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff’g, 190 B.R. 618 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1996), aff'g in part and rev'g in part on
reconsideration, 186 B.R. 88 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
CONTRACTS
BREACH OF WARRANTY. The plaintiff was a
wheat farmer who purchased winter wheat seed from the
defendant. The defendant’s agents orally represented that
the seed was certified and the delivery tickets also stated
that the seed was certified. The defendant had tested the
seed for germination and knew that the seed’s germination
rate was insufficient to qualify as certified seed. Each
delivery ticket carried terms of disclaimer of all warranties
except to the extent of the purchase price of the seed, but
the disclaimer was not discussed or negotiated by the
parties. The seed did not germinate properly and the
plaintiff lost the entire crop planted with the seed provided
by the defendant. The court held that the disclaimers were
ineffective to limit the defendant’s liability for breach of
warranty because the disclaimers did not specifically set
forth the aspects of the seed which were not warranted and
because the disclaimers were not negotiated by the parties.
The court also held that the disclaimers were
unconscionable because the defect of the seed was known
by the defendant and was not discoverable by the plaintiff
until the seed was used. The court also held that the
disclaimers were unenforceable because they failed of an
essential purpose in that the disclaimers deprived the
plaintiff of the substantive value of the seed as represented
as certified. The court noted that the oral and written
representations of the defendant that the seed was certified
were express warranties which were shown to be
breached. The plaintiff has also claimed that the defendant
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violated the Washington Seed Act and Consumer
Protection Act in labeling the seed as certified when the
defendant knew that the seed did not meet the germination
requirements for certified seed. The plaintiff had obtained
insurance proceeds from a private insurer and the ASCS
(now FSA) based on weather conditions which affected
the crop loss. The defendant sought an offset for the
insurance payments. The court held that the payments
were from collateral sources independent of the defendant
and from events separate from the breach of the warranty;
therefore, the defendant was not entitled to offset the
insurance proceeds from the amount awarded for the
breach of warranty.  Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers,




CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations which include the Table
Grape Endorsement in the Common Crop Insurance
Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to 1997 and
earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 47745 (Sept. 11, 1997).
P E S T I C I D E S . The EPA has issued proposed
regulations under the Worker Protection Standard for
agricultural workers. The proposed regulations allow the
wearing of separable glove liners to be worn beneath
chemical-resistant gloves. The proposed regulations also
delete the requirement that pilots must wear chemical-
resistant gloves when entering and exiting aircraft used to
apply pesticides. All other WPS provisions about glove
liners and chemical-resistant gloves are unaffected by the
proposed regulations. 62 Fed. Reg. 47543 (Sept. 9, 1997).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ANNUAL EXCLUSION-ALM § 6.01.* The
taxpayers established several trusts funded with interests
in farm land. Each trust had one of their four children as
primary income beneficiary, with contingent remainders to
the beneficiary’s children and the beneficiary’s siblings.
Each trust provided for an annual right to withdraw all or a
portion of annual contributions to the trust. The right of
withdrawal was granted to the income beneficiary and all
contingent beneficiaries. However, the right to withdraw
was not exercised by any beneficiary. The purpose of the
trusts was to pass the farm to the four children and the
actions of all parties remained consistent with that
purpose. The taxpayers claimed an annual federal gift tax
exclusion amount for each primary and contingent
beneficiary for transfers of interests in farm land to each
trust.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayers did not make gifts
of present interests to the contingent beneficiaries;
therefore, the taxpayers could not claim an annual
exclusion for the contingent beneficiaries. In support of its
ruling, the IRS focused on the remoteness of the
contingent interests, the intent to transfer the farm only to
the four primary beneficiaries, and the lack of exercise of
the annual withdrawal rights by the contingent
beneficiaries. Ltr. Rul. 9731004, April 21, 1997.
CAPITAL ASSETS. The Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 did not amend I.R.C. § 1223(11) which gives assets
held until death (other than livestock) a holding period of
“more than one year.” It is not clear whether assets must
be held an additional six months or the full period of
“more than 18 months” to be eligible for the 20 percent
and 10 percent capital gains rates for sales after July 28,
1997. A technical correction is expected to address the
problem.
The maximum 25 percent rate is applied to
“unrecaptured section 1250 gain” in the case of sale of
depreciable real property in the new capital gain provision.
It appears that, in the case of installment sale of eligible
assets, the amount subject to the 25 percent tax rate is not
subject to recapture treatment which must be includible in
income in the year of sale.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  The taxpayer had received an
interest in trust in property passing from a predeceased
spouse’s estate. The trust interest was QTIP and the estate
had claimed a marital deduction. The taxpayer executed an
untimely disclaimer of the interest in the trust, filed a
federal gift tax return for the transfer, and paid gift tax.
The trust interest passed to a child of the taxpayer who
reimbursed the taxpayer for the gift tax paid. The IRS
ruled that the amount of the gift, under I.R.C. § 2519 (the
value of the trust corpus less the value of the QTIP
interest) was reduced by the amount of gift taxes paid by
the donee. Ltr. Rul. 9736001, May 21, 1997.
IRA. The surviving spouse was a sole trustee and sole
beneficiary of a trust which was the designated beneficiary
of an IRA owned by the decedent. The surviving spouse
had the authority to revoke the trust at any time and the
power to appoint trust property to anyone. The surviving
spouse planned to take all distributions from the IRA to
the trust, in excess of the minimum required annual
distributions, and place them  into the surviving spouse’s
own IRA.  The IRS ruled that, because the surviving
spouse had the authority to revoke the trust, the IRA funds
passing to the trust and then to the spouse’s IRA would be
treated as passing directly from the IRA to the spouse.
Ltr. Rul. 9736042, June 10, 1997.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent was the beneficiary of a trust established by the
will of the decedent’s pre-deceased spouse. The trust was
adjudicated by the Tax Court as QTIP eligible, in part, for
the marital deduction. The Tax Court had ordered that the
trust be split into a QTIP trust and a non-QTIP trust;
however, the trustees failed to split the trust. The
decedent’s estate argued that, because the trust was not
split, some of the income and principal from the trust was
not paid to the decedent; therefore, the trust was not QTIP
and was not includible in the decedent’s gross estate. The
court held that, because a portion of the trust was allowed
as a marital deduction, that portion of the trust was
included in the decedent’s gross estate. Soberdash v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-362.
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POWER OF APPOINTMENT. A will established a
trust for the testator’s spouse and children, naming one of
the children as co-trustee with two unrelated persons. The
trust provided that the child could not participate in trust
decisions concerning distributions to the child or the
child’s dependents. The trust also provided the child with
the power to remove any co-trustee and to replace that
trustee with another unrelated and subordinate trustee. The
IRS ruled that the child did not have a general power of
appointment over trust corpus. Ltr. Rul. 9735023, May
30, 1997.
REVOCABLE TRANSFERS-ALM § 5.02[2].* The
decedent, who was childless, had provided some gifts for
the children and grandchildren of the decedent’s siblings.
However, none of the recipients was a dependent of the
decedent. After the decedent became incompetent, two
nephews were appointed as guardians of the decedent. The
guardians petitioned a state court to allow them to make
gifts on behalf of the decedent to members of the
decedent’s siblings’ families, including two large gifts to
the siblings. The purpose of the gifts was to decrease the
decedent’s estate tax liability, taking advantage of the
annual exclusion for gifts. The state court issued an order
approving the gifts. The estate argued that the state,
Maryland, allowed courts of equity to approve such gifts
under the substitution of judgment doctrine. The IRS ruled
that the doctrine was followed in Maryland but only to the
extent the gifts were made to persons who were
dependents of the donor. Thus, the IRS ruled that the gifts
made by the guardians under authority of the state court
order were not valid under state law and were, therefore,
revocable by the decedent and included in the decedent’s
gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9731003, March 31, 1997.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED POWERS-ALM
§ 5.02[3].* The decedent and spouse had transferred land
to an Illinois land trust and initially held a 50 percent
interest in the trust. The trust provided that the trust
principal could be transferred by the trustee only upon
written consent of holders of two-thirds of the interests in
the trust. The decedent made several inter vivos transfers
of portions of the decedent’s interest in the trust and the
decedent’s estate excluded these transferred interests from
the decedent’s estate. The IRS argued that Estate of
Bowgren v. Comm’r, 105 F.3d 1156 (7th Cir. 1997)
controlled as precedent to require that the transferred
interests were included in the decedent’s gross estate
because the decedent retained an interest in the transferred
interests. In Bowgren, the decedent had retained the sole
authority to allow the trustee to transfer trust assets. In this
case, the court followed Adolphson v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,048 (C.D. Ill. 1990) and held that the
trust assets were includible in the decedent’s gross estate
because the decedent, in conjunction with less than all
beneficiaries, had the authority to allow the trustee to
transfer trust assets. Swain v. U.S., 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,284 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
TRUSTS. The taxpayer established an inter vivos
irrevocable trust for a term of years for the benefit of the
taxpayer. The trust provided for quarterly annuity
payments of a percentage of the fair market value of trust
assets. The trust also provided that if the taxpayer died
before the termination of the trust, the annuity amount was
to be pro-rated to the date of death and paid to the
taxpayer’s estate, with the remainder of the trust assets
paid to the taxpayer’s estate. If the taxpayer survived the
termination of the trust, the trust assets were to be held in
trust until the taxpayer reached a certain age and then the
assets were to be distributed to the taxpayer. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer would be treated as the owner of
the trust assets for federal income and estate tax purposes
and that no gain or loss was recognized upon the transfer
of assets to the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9735034, June 2, 1997.
The taxpayer owned a vacation residence which
included a house, guest house, two detached garages, a
boathouse, two sheds and a pond. The taxpayer had
obtained classification of the property as forest land for
local property tax valuation, although only minimal
harvesting of trees was planned. The property was subject
to restrictions on subdivision in order to preserve the
natural watershed drainage. The taxpayer transferred the
property to a trust for 20 years, with the taxpayer as
beneficiary. If the taxpayer died before the end of the trust,
the property passed under the taxpayer’s will. If the
taxpayer and spouse survived the trust, the property passed
to the taxpayer’s spouse and children, with the remainder
passing to the children. During the taxpayer’s lifetime
after the trust term, the taxpayer was to pay fair market
rental to the beneficiaries, who were not obligated to rent
the property to the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the trust
was a qualified personal residence trust and the trust
property would not be included in the taxpayer’s gross
estate. Ltr. Rul. 9735035, June 2, 1997.
In 1959, the taxpayer established trusts for the
taxpayer’s children, naming the taxpayer’s brother as
individual trustee. In the same year, the taxpayer’s sister
established trusts for her children, also naming the brother
as individual trustee. In 1985, the brother resigned as
trustee of both sets of trusts and the taxpayer was made
trustee of the sister’s trusts and the sister was made trustee
of the taxpayer’s trusts. Now the taxpayer and sister
propose to amend the trusts to make the children trustees
of trusts of which the child was not a beneficiary. The IRS
ruled that the trusts were not included in the taxpayer’s
gross estate because there was no intent to establish
reciprocal trusts with the sister, since the taxpayer and
sister were made trustees 16 years after the trusts were
established. The IRS also ruled that the taxpayer did not
hold a power of appointment over the trust. Finally, the
IRS ruled that the changes in the trustee designations did
not cause the trusts to be subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9735025, May 3, 1997.
VALUATION. The decedent’s son held a power of
attorney over the decedent’s assets and caused several
checks to be written and contributed to a family limited
partnership which held an indirect interest in another
independent partnership which invested in high risk
derivative securities. The decedent’s estate discounted the
value of the partnership interests acquired with the checks
by 55 percent because of the high risk nature of the
investments. The IRS disallowed the discounting of the
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partnership interests because the sole purpose of the
contributions to the partnership was to reduce the value of
the decedent’s estate. In addition, the IRS noted that the
price of the partnership interests was already discounted
for the nature of the investment when the contributions
were made. Ltr. Rul. 9735003, May 8, 1997.
After the decedent became terminally ill, the
decedent’s child was given a durable power of attorney
over the decedent’s financial affairs. The child formed two
limited liability companies and transferred much of the
decedent’s assets to the LLCs. The LLC agreements
contained restrictions on sale of the interests in the LLCs.
The decedent had established an inter vivos trust, under
which the remainder would have passed to the decedent’s
two children. The child, under the power of attorney,
transferred the trust to the LLCs in exchange for interests
in the LLCs. The decedent’s estate valued the decedent’s
interests in the LLCs using a 75 percent discount for lack
of marketability and minority interests held by the
decedent. At the death of the decedent, the LLC interests
passed to the trust remainder holders. The IRS ruled that
the LLC interests would be disregarded for purposes of
valuing the decedent’s gross estate because the acquisition
of the LLC interests was made within a family, had no
business purpose other than to decrease the value for
estate tax purposes, and did not change the testamentary




CONSERVATION EASEMENTS. The taxpayer was
a water company which owned a reservoir and
surrounding land. The reservoir created a habitat for flora
and fauna and a greenbelt within an urban area. The local
governments and an environmental preservation
foundation sought to acquire the land and reservoir to
prevent development of the area. The taxpayer conveyed
the reservoir and a conservation easement on the land
which prevented development of the property, but
reserved the taxpayer’s right to withdraw water, except to
the extent the loss of water would endanger the wildlife on
the property. The IRS ruled that the conservation easement
qualified as a charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9736016,
June 5, 1997.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer was awarded a cash judgment of punitive
damages in a tort suit against an insurance company. Fifty
percent of the award was paid to the taxpayer’s attorney
for the contingent fee charged. Under Alabama law, the
attorney fee was not included in the taxpayer’s income.
The court held that the attorney fee paid was not included
in the taxpayer’s income. In re Hamilton, 97-2 U.S. Tax
Ca. (CCH) ¶ 50,628 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in August
1997, the weighted average is 6.85 percent with the
permissible range of 6.16 to 7.33 percent (90 to 109
percent permissable range) and 6.16 to 7.53 percent (90 to
110 percent permissable range) for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 97-47, I.R.B. 1997-35, 5.
RETURNS. Under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub.
L. No. 104-168, § 1210, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) the “timely
mailing as timely filing/paying” rule of I.R.C. § 7502(a)
can be met by using designated private delivery service
instead of the U.S. Postal Service. The IRS has announced
that the designation of four private delivery services in
Notice 97-26, I.R.B. 1997-17, 6 (see p. 70 supra) remains
unchanged. The IRS also announced that the designation
of private delivery services will be made only annually on
or before September 1 of each year. Notice 97-50, I.R.B.
1997-37.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
MORE THAN ONE CLASS OF STOCK. An S
corporation entered into a split-dollar insurance agreement
with a trust which held life insurance policies on the life of
an employee of the corporation. The agreements provided
that the trust would reimburse the corporation for the “cost
of current insurance protection” as determined by
economic benefit rules. At the death of the insured or upon
the surrender of the policy before the death of the insured,
the corporation would receive the lesser of the cash value
of the policy or the amount of premiums paid by the
corporation. The IRS ruled that the split-dollar life
insurance agreement did not create a second class of stock.
Ltr. Rul. 9735006, May 20, 1997.
NEGLIGENCE
GRAIN ELEVATOR. The plaintiff was injured while
delivering grain to a grain elevator owned by the
defendant during a lightning storm which ignited grain
dust. The plaintiff sought recovery in negligence for the
failure of the defendant to place lightning rods on the
elevator and for failure to evacuate the premises during the
storm. The defendant argued that an expert on lightning
devices was not qualified to give opinion testimony as to
the need for the lightning devices. The court held that the
expert witness did not need to be fully qualified because
the witness was testifying about matters within the
common knowledge of the jurors, the dangerousness of
lightning and the need for protection. The defendant also
argued that the evacuation issue should not have been
given to the jury. The court held that the plaintiff failed to
identify any statutory or other duty to evacuate the
building during a storm. Messink v. American Grain,
564 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1997).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The plaintiff had loaned funds to a
livestock rancher and dealer and secured the loan with a
perfected security interest in all current and after-acquired
livestock of the debtor. The debtor contracted with the
defendant for the purchase and immediate resale of cattle
to a third party for cash. The defendant delivered the cattle
to a third party feedlot designated by the debtor. The
debtor issued checks for the livestock but the checks were
not honored. The debtor was in bankruptcy at the time of
the transaction and the plaintiff sought to include the
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livestock as collateral under the after-acquired property
clause of the security agreement. The defendant sought
reclamation of the cattle after the checks bounced. Thus,
the issue was whether the defendant’s right of reclamation
or the plaintiff’s security interest had priority. The court
held that the debtor obtained sufficient rights in the
livestock upon delivery for the security interest to attach
and for the debtor to convey title to another good faith
purchaser free of the defendant’s reclamation right.
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff’s security
interest had priority over the defendant’s right of
reclamation. Cooperative Finance Ass’n v. B&J Cattle,
937 P.2d 915 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
FORECLOSURE SALE. The plaintiffs owned 295
acres of farm land which were subject to a mortgage. All
of the acres were covered by the mortgage as a single
parcel of land; however, the acres were separated by three
roads into a 220 acre parcel, a 70 acre parcel and a five
acre parcel. The plaintiffs defaulted on the mortgage and
the land was sold at an auction which offered the land as
one parcel. The plaintiffs argued that the land should have
been offered for sale first in three parcels in order to
obtain the highest price. The trial court had ruled that the
price received for the land was fair and reasonable. The
appellate court held that, because the mortgage covered all
the acres as one unit, the mortgagee was not required to
offer the land in smaller parcels at the foreclosure sale.
The court noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide any
evidence that offering the farm in smaller parcels would
have obtained a higher price for the entire farm. Dixon v.
Farm Credit Bank of Texas, 689 So.2d 135 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1996).
WAREHOUSE. The plaintiff was a bank which held a
perfected security interest in tobacco grown by the debtor.
The debtor had borrowed funds from the defendant
tobacco warehouse but the warehouse did not perfect a
security interest in the tobacco grown with the funds. The
harvested tobacco was delivered to the defendant and sold,
but because the sale proceeds did not exceed the debt,
nothing was paid to the debtor. The plaintiff filed a notice
of the security interest with the defendant after the sale but
before the debtor received any of the proceeds of the sale,
since the debtor never received any proceeds. The
defendant argued that Ky. Rev. Stat. § 355.9-307(2)
relieved the warehouse of any liability to the plaintiff for
the proceeds of the tobacco sale. The court held that the
statute was not intended to apply to warehouses which
were also creditors of a tobacco grower. The court cited a
Washington case, Food Services of America v. Royal
Heights, Inc., 871 P.2d 590 (1994) in support of its
holding. Farmers Bank v. Dykes Tobacco, Inc., 945
S.W.2d 433 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL LAND-ALM § 13.06.* In 1996,
the state of Wisconsin passed a law to phase-in use
valuation of agricultural land. The phase in required an
initial freeze of valuation of all agricultural land with an
annual change in the method of valuation to alter that
frozen valuation by the use value of the land. The
plaintiffs included agricultural land owners who claimed
that the law violated the uniformity clause of the
Wisconsin constitution because the frozen aspect of the
valuation did not take into account land which decreased
in value during the phase-in period, resulting in different
tax rates for the land with decreased value. The court
found that the plaintiffs had no evidence that this
difference had actually occurred at the time of the suit,
primarily because the suit was brought soon after the law
was enacted. The court dismissed the case without
prejudice, noting that another suit could be brought if the
tax rate difference was shown to occur. Norquist v.
Zeuske, 564 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. 1997).
ZONING
LIVESTOCK CONFINEMENT FACILITIES. In
April 1994, the plaintiffs acquired 3,000 acres of farm
land and constructed several hog confinement facilities on
the property, including confinement buildings and waste
lagoons. In June 1994, the defendant township
promulgated zoning regulations which established
bonding (for the coverage of possible cleanup costs) and
setback requirements for livestock confinement facilities.
The plaintiffs’ facilities were found not to be in
compliance with the new regulations and the plaintiffs
brought suit for an injunction against enforcement of the
regulations as without statutory authority. The plaintiffs
argued that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 65.677 prohibited
enforcement of zoning powers against farm buildings or
farm structures and that the confinement facilities were
either farm buildings or structures. In addition, the
plaintiffs argued that the township’s zoning powers did
not include the authority to require bonds for buildings or
for the cleanup costs of the use of land. The defendant
argued that the statute was ambiguous in that it did allow
the regulation of agricultural use of land. The court held
that the livestock confinement buildings and lagoons were
farm structures under the statute and exempt from zoning
regulation by the defendant. The township also sought to
enforce its regulations as equitable relief against the
plaintiffs’ buildings as a public nuisance. The court held
that the township had no authority under Mo. Rev. Stat. §
65.677 to bring a public nuisance action. Premium
Standard Farms v. Lincoln Township, 946 S.W. 2d 234
(Mo. 1997).
CITATION UPDATE
Estate of Kokernot v. Comm’r, 112 F.3d 1290 (5th
Cir. 1997), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1995-590 (special use
valuation) see p. 101 supra.
Bolding v. Comm’r, 117 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 1997),
rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1995-326. (shareholder basis) see p.
127 supra.
Patten v. United States, 116 F.3d 1029 (4th Cir.
1997), aff’g, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,231 (W.D.
Va. 1996) (joint tenancy property) see p. 108 supra.
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2d ANNUAL SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 5-9, 1998 at the
spectacular ocean-front Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort on
the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, family-owned business exclusion,
handling life insurance, marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both
spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income
in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale
transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
   •  Ethics (2 hours).
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
group discount air fares on United Airlines, available
through Sun Quest Vacations. In addition, attendees are
eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort, the site of the seminar.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares
and insure availability of convenient flights at a busy travel
time of the year.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
If you have not yet received a registration packet call
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